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SHELTON V SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO FLORIDA'S DRUG LAW
Noah Al-Malt *
I. INTRODUCTION
Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, a recent federal district court
case, has created a wave of constitutional challenges to Florida's Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Statute.' Decided in July 2011, the Federal District Court for
the Middle District of Florida considered a facially constitutional challenge to Flor-
ida Statute section 893.13, Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Statute.2
The court addressed the constitutional issue in Shelton, the 2002 amendment to
Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Law, and held that Florida's amend-
ed drug statute had effectively created a strict liability crime. Because of its sub-
stantial penalties, social stigma, and overly broad nature, this law is incongruous
with notions of due process. 3 This case note will address the analysis and effects of
Shelton on Florida's state criminal courts, and it will propose effective remedies
that would bring Florida's drug laws into conformity with the Constitution of the
United States.
A. History of Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Law
Prior to 2002, Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Law stated the fol-
lowing:
(1)(a) Except as authorized by this chapter and chapter 499, it is
unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or
possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled
substance. Any person who violates this provision with respect to:
1. A controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03(1)(a),
(1)(b), (1)(d), (2)(a), (2)(b), or (2)(c) 4., commits a felony of the
second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or
s. 775.084.
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Barry University Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law.
1. Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
2. FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (2012).
3. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1296.
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(6)(a) It is unlawful for any person to be in actual or constructive
possession of a controlled substance unless such controlled sub-
stance was lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant to a
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the
course of his professional practice or to be in actual or constructive
possession of a controlled substance except as otherwise author-
ized by this chapter. Any person who violates this provision com-
mits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.4
This Statute, by its lack of a specific mens rea, designates drug possession as a
general intent crime.' A general intent crime is a crime that involves performing a
particular act without intending a further act or a further result.6 Prior to 1996, Flor-
ida case law held that where a crime was a general intent crime, the state need not
prove criminal intent, and thus "guilty knowledge" is not a required element.7 In
State v. Medlin, the Florida Supreme Court elaborated that Florida case law sets out
a rule that:
Where a statute denounces the doing of an act as criminal without
specifically requiring criminal intent, it is not necessary for the
State to prove that the commission of such act was accompanied
by criminal intent. It is only when criminal intent is required as an
element of the offense that the question of 'guilty knowledge' may
become pertinent in the State's case.
However, in 1996, while deliberating on the issue of mens rea and guilty
knowledge in reference to drug possession, the Florida Supreme Court in Chicone
v. State, essentially grafted a guilty knowledge requirement onto Florida's Drug
Possession Abuse and Control Statute.9
1. Knowledge of Illicit Nature: Chicone v. State
In Chicone, the petitioner was convicted of possession of cocaine and drug
paraphernalia.10 On appeal, he asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to in-
struct the jury that the state had to prove that he knew the substance he possessed
4. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(a), (6)(a) (2000).
5. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) Mens rea is defined as "guilty mind." Id. "The state of
mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime....
[A]n intention to do the act which is made penal by statute or by the common law." Id
6. 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 118 (2013).
7. State v. Medlin, 273 So. 2d 394, 396 (Fla. 1973).
8. Id.
9. Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736, 743 (Fla. 1996).
10. Id. at 737.
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was cocaine, and the object he possessed was paraphernalia." The court held that
guilty knowledge or "knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance" is an essen-
tial element of the crime of possession, and "if specifically requested by a defend-
ant, the trial court should expressly indicate to jurors that guilty knowledge means
the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly
possessed."l2
The Chicone court was influenced by the proposition of law set forth in Dennis
v. United States.13 The Dennis Court held that "[t]he existence of a mens rea is the
rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence."l 4 The Chicone court concluded that good sense and the rule of
common law favored a scienter requirement. '5 The court additionally noted that,
"[a]s all agree, including the State, the legislature would not ordinarily criminalize
the 'innocent' possession of illegal drugs. Silence does not suggest that the legisla-
ture dispensed with scienter here."'6
The court, by analysis of Staples v. United States, recognized that applying a
felony punishment to a strict liability offense was contradictory with the theory of
public welfare offenses.' 7 With such a harsh penalty and social stigma attached to
the punishment, the lack of mens rea would result in a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'1 By this reasoning the Court opined:
We believe it was the intent of the legislature to prohibit the know-
ing possession of illicit items and to prevent persons from doing so
by attaching a substantial criminal penalty to such conduct. Thus,
we hold that the State was required to prove that Chicone knew of
the illicit nature of the items in his possession.
The court, therefore, affixed a two-faceted knowledge requirement onto the
Statute: (1) the defendant must have knowledge of the presence of the substance;
and (2) he or she must also be aware of its illicit nature. 20 Florida attorneys have
understood the holding of Chicone to be multi-faceted. 2' The plain language of the
Statute imposes no mens rea requirement.22 Absent this requirement, the offense is
a strict liability offense, which includes both innocent and innocuous conduct.2 3
11. Id. at 738.
12. Id. at 745-46.
13. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
14. Id
15. Chicone, 684 So. 2d at 743-44.
16. Id. at 744.
17. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
18. Chicone, 684 So. 2d at 744.
19. Id.
20. See generally Chicone, 684 So. 2d 736.
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Under Staples, the imposition of felony punishment for a strict liability offense
24
violates due process.
It is presumed that the legislature did not intend to enact an uncon-
stitutional statute; . . . it is necessary, therefore, to save the consti-
tutionality of the possession of cocaine statute by inferring, as a
matter of judicial construction, the mens rea element of knowledge
of the illicit nature of the substance.25
2. After Chicone-Scott v. State
Subsequently in Scott v. State, the Florida Supreme Court re-affirmed Chicone
and answered the following questions of law:
Does the illegal possession of a controlled substance raise a rebut-
table presumption (or inference) that the defendant had knowledge
of its illicit nature? If so, if the defendant fails to raise the issue
that he was unaware of the illicit nature of the substance, is he
nevertheless entitled to a Chicone instruction?26
The Florida Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative and
held that "knowledge of the illicit nature of the contraband is an element of the
crime of possession of a controlled substance, [and] a defendant is entitled to an
instruction on that element." 27 The court further stated that "[i]t is error to fail to
give an instruction even if the defendant did not explicitly say he did not have
knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance." 2 8
B. The Legislature's Response-Florida Statute Section 893.101
The Florida Legislature, displeased with the holdings in Chicone and Scott, re-
acted in 2002 with House Bill 1935.29 It amended section 813.13, providing the
following language:
(1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. State, Slip Opin-
ion No. SC94701 (Fla. 2002) and Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736
(Fla. 1996), holding that the state must prove that the defendant
knew of the illicit nature of a controlled substance found in his or




26. Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 168 (Fla. 2002).
27. Id. at 171.
28. Id
29. H.B. 1935, 2002 Leg., 258th Sess. (Fla. 2002).
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(2) The Legislature finds that knowledge of the illicit nature of a
controlled substance is not an element of any offense under this
chapter. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled sub-
stance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter.
(3) In those instances in which a defendant asserts the affirmative
defense described in this section, the possession of a controlled
substance, whether actual or constructive, shall give rise to a per-
missive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of
the substance. It is the intent of the Legislature that, in those cases
where such an affirmative defense is raised, the jury shall be in-
structed on the permissive presumption provided in this subsec-
tion. "
By enacting this Statute, the Legislature "expressly provides that knowledge of
the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any offense under
chapter 893.",31 However, because of the doctrine of separation of powers, the Leg-
islature could not outright overrule the constitutional findings in Chicone.3 2 The
Legislature does, however, possess the authority to determine elements and defens-
es of a criminal offense.33 The Statute, in effect, supersedes Chicone and shifts the
burden of proof by re-designating the former element of guilty knowledge as an
affirmative defense. 34
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: SHELTON V. SECRETARYDEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
Petitioner Mackle Vincent Shelton was arrested and charged with numerous
criminal violations, including delivery of cocaine.3 1 Shelton was found guilty on
the cocaine charge, as well as four other charges. 36 Because of the 2002 amend-
ment to Florida's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Law, the jury was not in-
structed that illicit knowledge was an element of the offense. 3 7 Rather, the jury was
30. See id.
31. Shelton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Miller v. State,
35 So. 3d 162, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).
32. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
33. See State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 516 (Fla. 2004).
34. See Summa, supra note 21.
The enactment of F.S. § 893.101, however, did not overrule Chicone. The legislature could
not overrule the constitutional aspect of Chicone because the separation of powers doctrine
confers upon the judiciary the sole authority to say whether a statute is constitutional. On
the other hand, the legislature possesses the sole authority to determine the elements of a
criminal offense. It is correct to state, therefore, that the enactment of F.S. § 893.101 super-
seded Chicone, but only in part. Chicone's ultimate holding, that the mens rea element will
be inferred as a matter ofjudicial construction, may not stand.
Id.
35. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
36. Id.
37. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 893.101 (2012).
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simply instructed to determine: (1) whether Shelton delivered a certain substance,
and (2) whether that substance was cocaine.
Shelton exhausted his appeals for post-conviction relief and then petitioned for
federal habeas corpus relief. 9 In his petition for habeas corpus, Shelton claimed
"that [Florida Statute section] 893.13 is facially unconstitutional because it entirely
eliminates mens rea as an element of a drug offense and creates a strict liability
offense under which [he] was sentenced. . . ."40
The Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, granted Shelton's claim and
reviewed it de novo, noting that:
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal issued decisions affirming
the rulings of the trial court without opinion and without a merits-
based analysis of the federal constitutional claims, and thus its per
curiam affirmances do not constitute an adjudication of Petition-
er's facial challenge to the constitutionality of FLA. STAT § 893.13
on the merits. Therefore, no deference is due to the state court's
decision.4 1
The District Court, applying the same StapleS42 analysis utilized in Chicone,
held that section 893.13 is unconstitutional and facially invalid.43 The Court rea-
soned that by enacting Florida Statute section 893.101, the State Legislature af-
firmatively eliminated the mens rea and scienter requirement from a felony offense
and thus violated the petitioner's due process rights."
A. The Strict Liability Standard--Staples v. United States
Under Staples and its progeny, a strict liability offense may be constitutional,
but only "if: (1) the penalty imposed is slight; (2) a conviction does not result in
substantial stigma; and (3) the statute regulates inherently dangerous or deleterious
conduct."45 The State in Shelton asserted that although it eliminated the scienter
requirement from the Statute, it did allow for lack of knowledge as an affirmative
defense.4
The Shelton court observed that state legislatures may shift the burden of proof
to the defendant by naming an element as an affirmative defense, "[b]ut there are
obviously constitutional limits beyond which the states may not go in this re-
gard."A7 In addition, the Shelton court noted that "while the State is correct that the
38. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
39. Id. at 1296.
40. Id
41. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1297 (internal citations omitted).
42. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
43. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1298.
46. Id at 1306-07.
47. Id. at 1298 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977)).
446 Vol. 18, No. 2
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legislature has the authority to declare the elements of an offense, it 'must act with-
in any applicable constitutional constraints in defining criminal offenses."48 The
Shelton court noted that public welfare offenses-those lacking a mens rea-are
not unconstitutional per se, but may not be punished as felonies.4 9 The Shelton
court concluded that "[u]nder Staples and its progeny, the tripartite analysis for
evaluating a strict liability offense under the strictures of the Constitution involves
consideration of: (1) the penalty imposed; (2) the stigma associated with convic-
tion; and (3) the type of conduct purportedly regulated."50
B. Shelton's Constitutional Claim-Staples Analysis
1. Harsh Penalty Imposed
The Shelton court held that the Statute in question violates due process because
its penalties are severe. 5 1 The District Court reviewed the penalties attached to pos-
session-related crimes and concluded that for such harsh penalties and high period
of incarceration, Florida Statute section 893.13 does not pass constitutional mus-
ter.52 The Court reasoned that:
It cannot reasonably be asserted that the penalty for violating Flor-
ida's drug statute is 'relatively small'. A violation of §
893.13(1)(a)(1), for delivery of a controlled substance . . . is a se-
cond degree felony, ordinarily punishable by imprisonment for up
to fifteen years. For habitual violent felony offenders . . . a viola-
tion of § 893.13 (1)(a)(1) is punishable by imprisonment for up to
thirty years and includes a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence.
Other provisions of Florida's drug statute subject offenders to even
harsher penalties, including ordinary imprisonment for thirty years
for first time offenders and life imprisonment for recidivists."
Florida's drug Statute certainly has a severe penalty attached.5 4 While some
states similarly punish drug possession offenses as felonies with considerable pen-
alties attached, other states have rejected such a draconian and unreasonable con-
struction of the law because it criminalizes the "unknowing" possession of a con-
trolled substance. However, the Shelton court notes that Florida, by enactment of
48. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 241 (1999)).
49. Shelton, 802 F.Supp. 2d at 1300.
50. Id. (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1302.
53. Id. at 1300.
54. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 893.03-13 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 775.
55. See GA. STAT. ANN. § 16-13-30 (c).
Except as otherwise provided, any person who violates subsection (a) of this Code section
with respect to a controlled substance in Schedule I or a narcotic drug in Schedule 11 shall be
Spring 2013 447
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section 893.101, "stands alone in its express elimination of mens rea as an element
of a drug offense."56
2. Florida Statute Section 893.13 Violates Due Process Because It
Creates a Substantial Social Stigma
The District Court recognized the severe stigma that a felony conviction can
give to a defendant. The negative social effects of a felony conviction are devastat-
ing to an individual because a felony "is as bad a word as you can give to [a] man
or thing."57 The court addressed the substantial effects a felony conviction can have
upon one's individual liberties and it also noted that the State had little argument to
offer on this point. 8 The court is undoubtedly correct on this aspect. A drug pos-
session conviction leads to substantial social stigma, "gravely besmirches" the de-
fendant's reputation, and also imposes a significant burden on those released from
incarceration.5 9 Severe drug and social policies may cause restrictions on employ-
ment, housing, education, welfare, mental health and substance abuse treatment,
and can make it exceedingly difficult for released offenders to succeed.60
3. Florida Statute Section 893.13 Violates Due Process Because It
Regulates Inherently Innocent Conduct
The Shelton court notes that while the Supreme Court has upheld statutes regu-
lating inherently dangerous conduct without requiring mens rea as to every ele-
ment, such instances involved at least some element that had a mens rea require-
ment.61 The Shelton court distinguished the United States Supreme Court case of
United States v. Balint, in which the Court found that the Statute at issue62 "was not
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than one year nor more than 15 years.
Id.
56. Shelton v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 802 F.Supp. 2d 1289, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2011); see e.g., State v. Bell,
649 N.W.2d 243, 252 (N.D. 2002) (noting the legislature amended North Dakota's drug laws in 1989 to include
the culpability requirement of "willfully" as an element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance,
thereby eliminating possession as a strict liability offense); see also State v. Brown, 389 So. 2d 48, 51 (La. 1980)
(concluding drug possession cannot be a strict liability crime because it would impermissibly criminalize unknow-
ing possession of a controlled substance and permit a person to be convicted "without ever being aware of the
nature of the substance he was given").
57. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952).
58. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. ("[The court noted that] [c]onvicted felons cannot vote, sit on a jury,
serve in public office, possess a firearm, obtain certain professional licenses, or obtain federal student loan assis-
tance. The label of 'convicted felon' combined with a proclamation that the defendant is so vile that he must be
separated from society for fifteen to thirty years, creates irreparable damage to the defendant's reputation and
standing in the community.").
59. Id
60. For more discussion see Julia van Olphen, Michele J. Eliason, Nicholas Freudenberg & Marilyn
Barnes, Nowhere To Go: How Stigma Limits the Options of Female Drug Users After Release From Jail,
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, PREVENTION & POLICY (May 8, 2009), available at
http://www.substanceabusepolicy.com/content/4/1/10.
61. Shelton, 802 F.Supp. 2d at 1300.
62. Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914, 21 U.S.C. § 174.
448
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a true strict liability statute because it required proof that the defendant knew that
he was selling 'dangerous narcotics."' 63 In Balint, the Supreme Court held that due
process was satisfied without knowing that the specific narcotics he was dealing
were regulated because
where one deals with others and his mere negligence may be dan-
gerous to them, as in selling diseased food or poison, the policy of
the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require the punish-
ment of the negligent person though he be ignorant of the noxious
character of what he sells. 4
By contrast, the Shelton court held that Florida's Statute does not require even
a de minimus showing that the defendant knew he was dealing with an illicit sub-
stance. 6 5 The District Court also reasoned under Staples that the Supreme Court
might suggest that
"punishing a violation as a felony is simply incompatible with the
theory of the public welfare offense," and that "absent a clear
statement from Congress that mens rea is not required, we should
not apply the public welfare offense rationale to interpret any stat-
ute defining a felony offense as dispensing with mens rea."
III. HAS FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 893.101 REALLY ELIMINATED A MENS
REA REQUIREMENT?
Specifically, Florida's jury instructions provide that in order to establish the
crime of Drug Possession, the State must prove the following three elements be-
yond a reasonable doubt:
1. (Defendant) possessed a certain substance.
2. The substance was ([the] specific substance alleged).
3. (Defendant) had knowledge of the presence of the substance.67
Under the current Statute, the prosecution is still required to prove that the de-
fendant had knowledge of the presence of the substance. 68 However, under the cur-
rent scheme of case law, knowledge is often presumptive.
63. Shelton, 802 F.Supp 2d at 1303 (quoting Balint v. United States, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922)).
64. Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-53.
65. Shelton, 802 F.Supp. 2d at 1304.
66. Id. at 1305 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 618).
67. FLA. STD. JURY INST. § 25.7. Note that this statute only requires proof of actual or constructive posses-
sion, and knowledge of the substance's presence. Id. Cf FLA. STD. JURY INST. § 25.2 (requiring intent to sell,
manufacture, or purchase).
68. See Willis v. State, 320 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
69. See id. If a person has exclusive possession of a controlled substance, knowledge of its presence may
be inferred or assumed; see also Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250, 251-52 (Fla. 1983) (describing that drugs were
scattered about the house and considered "in plain view" which constituted sufficient evidence to support convic-
tion for constructive possession as to the owner or lessee); see also State v. Williams, 742 So. 2d 509, 512 (Fla.
Spring 2013 449
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Consider two hypothetical situations in which a defendant is in actual or exclu-
sive constructive possession of the substance: (1) an unknowing defendant holds a
package that contains a controlled substance for a friend; and (2) a drug dealer
mails a package of marijuana to the wrong address and it ends up at the defendant's
home. In both examples, whether the defendant is holding it on his person or in a
conveyance such as a vehicle or house, both circumstances are sufficient to sustain
a conviction regardless of whether the defendant possesses knowledge of the pack-
age's contents. Knowledge is inferred because of the actual or exclusive construc-
tive possession of the package. Therefore, the "knowing" element in section 893.13
does not satisfy the requirement of mens rea.7 0 There is no burden on the State to
prove that the defendant intended or even actually knew of the controlled substanc-
es in his possession as this element is often presumptive.
As noted in Shelton, the Statute criminalizes innocent conduct such as simply
carrying or holding the property of another.7 1 District Judge Mary S. Schriven
elaborated that:
To state the obvious, there is a long tradition throughout human
existence of lawful delivery and transfer of containers that might
contain substances under innumerable facts and circumstances:
carrying luggage on and off of public transportation; carrying bags
in and out of stores and buildings; carrying book bags and purses
in schools and places of business and work; transporting boxes via
commercial transportation-the list extends ad infinitum. 7 2
"Where laws proscribe conduct that is neither inherently dangerous nor likely
to be regulated, the Supreme Court has consistently either invalidated them, or con-
strued them to require proof of mens rea in order to avoid criminalizing 'a broad
range of apparently innocent conduct."' 7 3 Thus, by adding the 2002 amendment to
section 893.13, the Florida Legislature has essentially done away with guilty
knowledge, and has effectively created a strict liability statute that criminalizes
innocuous conduct in certain circumstances.
The Shelton court discussed the State's assertion that the possession offense is
not a strict liability crime because the defendant may raise lack of knowledge as an
affirmative defense.74 The court cited two reasons why this contention fails:75 (1)
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("Knowledge of possession may be presumed or inferred where the State offers evidence of
actual possession or exclusive constructive possession.").
70. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1303 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
74. Under the Florida Standard Jury Instructions, the State is permitted to instruct the jury that they are
permitted to assume that a defendant was aware of the illicit nature of a controlled substance if he was in actual or
constructive possession of the substance. FLA. STD. JURY INST. § 25.7.
Knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance is not an element of the offense
of [insert name of offense charged]. Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled
substance is an affirmative defense. (Defendant) has raised this affirmative defense. Howev-
er, you are permitted to presume that (defendant) was aware of the illicit nature of the con-
Vol. 18, No. 2450
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whether a statute is a strict liability offense should be determined by its elements,
not affirmative defenses to it;76 and (2) a defendant possesses the burden of proof
on an affirmative defense while the State enjoys a presumption against it.77 The
Shelton court cited Patterson v. New York, in which the United States Supreme
Court discussed constitutional safeguards of due process and reiterated the basic
proposition of American criminal law: "A State must prove every ingredient of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt."78 In Patterson, the Supreme Court held that
the State "may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that
ingredient upon proof of the other elements is the offense." 7 9 This "shifting of the
burden of persuasion" is presumed "impermissible under the Due Process
Clause." 0
The Shelton court reconciled Patterson with Staples and held that while the
State is free to eliminate a mens rea requirement, it must still conform to the consti-
tutional safeguards of due process.' While the Florida Legislature has the authority
to manipulate or eliminate elements of criminal offenses, it has exceeded the
bounds of constitutional safeguards by eliminating mens rea in section 893.13:
More importantly, the Supreme Court's dicta in Staples that a leg-
islature is free to eliminate mens rea in defining the elements of an
offense does not dispense with its prior holdings requiring consti-
tutional scrutiny of any such promulgation. As the Court explained
in Patterson, even if the legislative bodies choose to eliminate el-
ements from criminal offenses "there are obviously constitutional
limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard " The
State of Florida exceeded those bounds in this instance. 82
Shelton is correct in its analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions in Staples
and its progeny. The Statute constitutes a strict liability crime that has both a severe
punishment and a strong social stigma attached to it. This is undeniably true. The
Statute is also overly broad and often criminalizes inherently innocuous conduct.8 3
Simply by being in actual or constructive possession of a package containing illicit
contents-regardless of intent or knowledge of the package's contents-can lead to
a felony conviction under Florida law. Although the legislature has shifted the
"guilty knowledge" element to an affirmative defense, when it comes to the current
trolled substance if you find that (defendant) was in actual or constructive possession of the
controlled substance.
Id.
75. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
82. Id. (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977)) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
83. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
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scheme of case law, defendants have little to no affirmative defenses available to
them.
IV. So WHAT Now? WHAT EFFECT DOES SHELTON HAVE-IS SHELTON
BINDING ON FLORIDA'S COURTS? IF NOT, SHOULD IT BE PERSUASIVE?
Shelton has caused a whirlwind of decisions in Florida's circuit courts. Courts
have offered various conflicting opinions on whether or not Shelton is binding and
whether or not they agree with Shelton's analysis.84 Initially, this case caused dras-
tically inconsistent judgments across Florida's county and circuit courts.85 Howev-
er, a few district courts of appeal have spoken on the issue and offered clarifica-
tion. The Florida Supreme Court and the 11th Circuit have also rendered opin-
ions on the issue. As it stands now, the state courts must disregard Shelton until it
is addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
A. Circuit Court Confusion
The Eleventh Judicial Circuit, faced with thirty-nine defendants' motions to
suppress pursuant to Shelton, agreed with the District Court's ruling and found the
opinion to be binding upon the state courts.88 The court analyzed the Staples factors
discussed in Shelton and agreed with its findings:
As to the first two Staples factors-severity of punishment and of
attendant social stigma-Shelton's analysis was uncomplicated
and incontrovertible. The crime with which Shelton was charged,
delivery of a relatively small amount of cocaine, is made a second-
degree felony by the statute and is punishable by up to 15 years
imprisonment. This is logarithmically greater than any sentence
ever found to be constitutionally permitted when attached to a
strict liability crime.8 9
The Eleventh Judicial Circuit agreed with Shelton's contention that section
893.13 is overly broad. The court recognized that the Statute does not penalize
intentional possession or delivery-or even knowing possession-but equally pun-
ishes those who unintentionally engage in the act. 90 As to whether or not Shelton is
84. See infra Part IV(a)-(d).
85. See infra Part IV(a).
86. See infra Part IV(b)
87. See infra Part IV(c)(d).
88. State v. Washington, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. I 129a (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 2011) (citing Shelton
v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2011)).
89. Id.
90. The Eleventh Judicial Circuit went on to note:
According to Shelton, § 893.13 casts much too broad a net. It does not penalize the inten-
tional possession or delivery of drugs, or the knowing possession or delivery of drugs; it
punishes the possession or delivery of drugs, however unintentional, however unknowing. It
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binding, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit reasoned that "the Florida Supreme Court has
'recognize[d], of course, that state courts are bound by federal court determinations
of federal law questions.' 9 ' The Eleventh Circuit recognized that rulings of lower
federal courts on matters of state law are not binding on state courts; however, it
reasoned that the Shelton court was not construing section 893.13 as to an issue of
interpretation, but it held that the Statute is at odds with the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment-clearly a federal constitutional issue.92
The State Attorney's Office for the Eleventh Circuit referred to State v. Dwyer
when arguing that federal courts are not authoritative for construction or interpreta-
tion of Florida statutes. 93 However, Judge Milton Hirsch for the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Florida took the position that Dwyer is inapplicable and a "poor choice
of authority."94 Judge Hirsch reconciled Shelton with Dwyer, and declared that in
Shelton, the Florida Supreme Court had already imposed limiting constructions in
order to bring the state Statute into conformity with the constitutional requirements
of Due Process.9 5 The legislature then reacted and rendered those decisions in
Chicone and Scott null.96 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that in Shelton, the "feder-
al court was simply picking up where the Chicone and Scott state courts had left
off."97 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit took the view that even if treated as
"merely persuasive," Shelton's conclusion that section 893.13 violates due process
by criminalizing conduct in the complete absence of scienter "is irrefragable."98
The foremost argument for the Statute's unconstitutionality is that section 893.13
does not punish those who choose to deliver controlled substances, but punishes
those who possess them whether or not they choose to do so.99
The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida takes the opposite view and disagrees
with this reasoning-not on the issue of whether Shelton is binding-but that Flor-
ida's Statute is not unconstitutional. 00 In Barnett, the Thirteenth Circuit Court rea-
soned that in Chicone "the court was not choosing between a strict liability inter-
punishes an activity-e.g., carrying a package-that is inherently innocuous, rather than one
that is inherently dangerous. It punishes the act of possession or delivery simpliciter.
Id.
91. Id. (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375 n.9 (Fla. 1978)).
92. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03.
93. See generally State v. Dwyer, 332 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1976).




No Florida case has decided the issue presently before me: whether § 893.13 is unconstitu-
tional by operation of the 14th Amendment of the federal Constitution. . . . the Florida cases
that appear to give passing consideration to the issue of constitutionality or not of the statute
"contain no analysis of or citation to the tripartite constitutional analysis" required by Sta-
ples and other U.S. Supreme Court authorities, and employed in Shelton. Accordingly, I am
bound to follow Shelton's holding that § 893.13 violates the 14th Amendment's due process
guarantee.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See State v. Barnett, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. I I27a (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011).
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pretation and an interpretation engrafting a knowledge element: it was choosing
between two interpretations that each had a knowledge element, with the difference
being how specific the knowledge element needed to be."o' The Thirteenth Circuit
concluded that the 2002 enactment of section 893.101 did not eliminate the ele-
ment of knowledge entirely and that Shelton did not question due process standard
for the remaining knowledge element. 102 The court also reasoned "actual practice in
Florida courts does include a general intent scienter requirement." 03
B. Appellate Review
As for appellate decisions, the Second District Court of Appeal was the first
appellate court to speak on the issue. The court recognized the inconsistencies in
the circuit court opinions and issued a Certification Order Requiring Immediate
Resolution by the Supreme Court.104 The Second District observed the fact that
rendering an opinion on the issue would be binding on all state courts, yet avoided
making a ruling by stating that the Florida Supreme Court would be best suited to
make such a judgment.05
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in a per curiam decision, denied chal-
lenges to the Statute in light of Shelton and opined, "This court previously ad-
dressed the very same issue raised in Shelton in Williams v. State, and upheld the
drug possession statute as constitutional."l 0 6
The First District Court of Appeal offered a binding decision.'0o The court rec-
ognized in Flagg v. State that although the Second District had certified the issue
for immediate resolution by the Florida Supreme Court,
a definitive statement from this court reaffirming the constitution-
ality of § section 893.13 notwithstanding Shelton will promote the




104. State v. Adkins, 71 So. 3d 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
105. Id. at 185.
Section 893.13 is the criminal statute most commonly used in Florida to enforce our laws
against the manufacture, possession, and sale of illegal drugs. The ruling of the circuit court
in this case would appear to control pending drug prosecutions in only one felony division
of the Twelfth Circuit. This issue, however, will undoubtedly be raised in every felony divi-
sion in all twenty circuits. It is clear from the four above-cited cases that judges will take at
least two different approaches to the issue. It is entirely possible that many circuits will find
themselves in the untenable situation of having two or more felony divisions taking opposite
positions on this issue ....
Until this important constitutional question is resolved by the Florida Supreme Court, pros-
ecutions for drug offenses will be subject to great uncertainty throughout Florida.
Id.
106. Holmes v. State, 74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Williams v. State, 45 So. 3d 14, 15-16
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)) (internal citations omitted).
107. See generally Flagg v. State, 74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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trial courts, thereby allowing drug prosecutions to proceed, at least
until the supreme court or another district court weighs in on the
issue.108
The court in Flagg denied petitioner's motion to suppress on the basis that
Shelton is neither binding nor persuasive on Florida courts. 109 The court reasoned
that the Statute does require the defendant to establish innocence by proving a lack
of knowledge.o10 The court stated "rather, the statute provides that if the defense is
raised, the state has the burden to overcome the defense by proving beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the drugs.""' Thus,
because this defense is available to defendants who are accused of violating this
Statute-a defense not available to "true strict liability crimes"-it undermines the
proposition in Shelton.1 12
Although Flagg notes that knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled sub-
stance is an affirmative defense and the jury is permitted to find the defendant not
guilty if there is a question of whether a defendant had such knowledge, this de-
fense is illusory in most cases." The Florida Standard Jury Instructions provide
that the jury is permitted to find that a defendant had such knowledge if he was in
actual or constructive possession of the substance and knowledge is to be inferred
if the defendant was in exclusive possession.1 14
However, the court did note that the petitioner was still able to preserve his
constitutional claim for appellate or federal review, but the decision will preserve
the status quo until the Florida Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue.115 The
court also observed that district courts may still continue to take opposing sides in
the discussion, but this district's decision remains binding on all state courts.116
Since Flagg, the First District Court of Appeal has routinely denied Shelton
challenges. However, other district courts have also offered their opinions. The
108. Id. at 141.
109. Id. at 140.
110. Id.
11 . Id.
112. Id. at l41.
113. See generally Willis v. State, 320 So. 2d 823, 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
114. FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. 25.7.
115. Flagg v. State, 74 So. 3d 138, 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
116. Id.
Of course, defendants remain free to raise the constitutional argument to preserve the issue
for appellate or federal review, but this decision will at least preserve the status quo until the
supreme court addresses the issue, and it should also address the Second District's legiti-
mate concern in Adkins that, without a definitive ruling from a higher court, different cir-
cuits (or even different judges in the same circuit) may continue to take opposite positions
on the issue. See Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (recognizing that "in the
absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts").
Id
117. See Thompson v. State, 74 So. 3d 1132, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) ("[A]ppellant argued that his
convictions were unconstitutional and urged this court to adopt the reasoning of Shelton v. Secretary, Department
of Corrections. For the reasons explained in Flagg v. State, we court reject the reasoning and holding in Shelton.)
This court explained in Young v. State, 75 So. 3d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), "[W]e have previously rejected
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Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Maestas v. State, also found Shelton unpersua-
sive and denied the petitioner's appeal."' The court re-analyzed Chicone and dis-
tinguished knowledge of the presence of the substance from knowledge of its illicit
nature. 1 9 The court's argument in Maestas is that the presumption that a defendant
knew the illicit nature of the substance does not apply if a defendant is unaware of
the presence of the substance.120 Several recent appellate cases have followed this
*121
reasoning.
However, section 893.10 1's classification of drug possession as a general in-
tent crime does not require the State to prove that the defendant knew his conduct
was illegal, instead it forces the defendant to assert lack of guilty knowledge as an
affirmative defense.122 In the case of exclusive possession, the Statute requires that
knowledge be presumed.12 3 Florida cases have consistently upheld this proposition
of law.124 Under the current scheme of Florida case law and statutory regulations,
many defendants are without relief because they have to prove this affirmative de-
fense.12 5 Doctrines, such as the "plain view" doctrine and exclusive possession,
have routinely been used to presume knowledge.126 Similarly, dominion and con-
trol in constructive possession cases have been used to uphold convictions regard-
less of whether the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the substance. 27 Thus,
lack of scienter as an affirmative defense leaves defendants with little to no relief.
The "illicit knowledge" defense is nothing short of a mirage for most defendants.
this argument and are not inclined to reconsider it; further, Shelton is not binding on this court." See also Holmes
v. State, 74 So. 3d 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
118. See generally Maestas v. State, 76 So. 3d 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
119. Id. at 994 ("Lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a substance is distinct from lack of knowledge of
the presence of the substance.").
120. Id. Florida Statute section 893.101 recognizes that "actual or constructive possession" must be found
for the presumption to apply. See also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (Crim.) 25.7 ("[Y]ou are permitted to presume that
(defendant) was aware of the illicit nature of the controlled substance ifyou find that (defendant) was in actual or
constructive possession of the controlled substance.") (emphasis added). The State must prove knowledge of
presence in order to establish actual or constructive possession. Thus, the permissive presumption that a defendant
knew the illicit nature of the substance does not apply if a defendant is unaware of the presence of the substance.
121. See generally Adams v. State, 76 So. 3d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); King v. State, 76 So. 3d 1069
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Smith v. State, 77 So. 3d 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
122. Wright v. State, 920 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). "The statute does two things: it makes
possession of a controlled substance a general intent crime, no longer requiring the state to prove that a violator be
aware that the contraband is illegal, and, second, it allows a defendant to assert lack of knowledge as an affirma-
tive defense." Id (emphasis added).
123. FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. §25.7.
124. See Gartrell v. State, 626 So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Fla. 1993) (citing Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117, 120
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that knowledge of possession may be inferred from the defendant's exclusive
possession of the substance)).
125. Wright, 920 So. 2d at 24.
126. See Lee v. State, 835 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that evidence that defend-
ant had sole possession and control of vehicle when arrested, and that marijuana cigarette was later found during
course of inventory search of vehicle, was sufficient to prove a prima facie case of possession of marijuana); see
also Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 1983) (even in a case of joint occupancy, where drugs were found
in "plain view" in common areas of the house, knowledge and dominion and control were presumed and this was
sufficient evidence for a conviction).
127. See Lee, 835 So. 2d at 1180; Brown, 428 So. 2d at 251.
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C. The Florida Supreme Court
The Florida Supreme Court granted review of the Second District Court of Ap-
peal's case State v. Adkins.12 8 Undeniably, this is an important question for resolu-
tion by the Florida Supreme Court. Uniformity of state law is important to the
framework of jurisprudence. Without resolution, appellate courts would have con-
tinued to make conflicting judgments about the applicability of section 893.13, a
frequently violated statute.12 9 However, the Court got this important question gross-
ly wrong.
In Adkins, the Florida Supreme Court considered "case law that discuss[ed] the
broad authority of the legislative branch to define the elements of criminal offens-
es."i130 In the Court's opinion, this "case law recognizes that due process ordinarily
does not preclude the creation of an offense without a guilty knowledge ele-
ment."' 3 1 The Florida Supreme Court looked to the United States Supreme Court
case of Balint v. United States.'32 In Balint, the Supreme Court upheld the Narcotic
Act of December 17, 1914, an act that created a strict liability crime for manufac-
turing, importing, dealing, and distributing opium or coca leaves.'33 The Court
looked to Balint to uphold its proposition that the legislature has broad discretion to
define criminal offenses.134 The Court also looked to several other cases where the
elimination of mens rea has been found to be in violation of due process.135 The
Court distinguished these cases from the Adkins case and found that because the
facts of Adkins were not a match to any of the facts in the cited case law, no due
process violation has arisen in the case at bar. 3 6
It is true that the Supreme Court has upheld strict liability schemes for public
welfare offenses.137 However, the Florida Supreme Court ignored the Staples tri-
partite analysis to determine the Statute's constitutionality. The Staples case pro-
vides a clear analysis for determining whether a strict liability offense comports
with due process.' The Court mentioned Staples, but failed to follow its analysis.
Rather, the Court looked to cases that were off point in an effort to support its con-
clusion.' 39 The test should have been the Staples tripartite analysis: (1) the penalty
128. State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 414 (Fla. 2012).
129. The Facts About Mandatory Minimum Drug Laws in Florida: A Failure of Public Safety, Public
Health, and Fiscal Responsibility, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, available at
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/FL%20General%20MM%20fact%20sheet%20 8-27-09 .pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2013) (stating that in 2007 and 2008, almost 30% of people entering prisons did so for a drug offense and
that 20% of the prison population, over 20,000 people, were serving time for a drug offense).
130. Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 416.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 417 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922)).
133. Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
134. Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 418.
135. Id. at 419. (citing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959)).
136. Adkins, 96 So. 3d at 423.
137. Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
138. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
139. See Shelton v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977) ("A State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt ... it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming the ingredient upon proof of the other
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imposed; (2) the stigma associated with conviction; and (3) the type of conduct
purportedly regulated.140 This test provides a clear set of standards to test the con-
stitutionality of a strict liability crime. The legislature does have broad power to
define the elements of a crime, however, under a strict liability analysis, the crime
must comport with constitutional notions of due process. 14 1
Additionally, the Court failed to recognize that this legal scheme effectively
removes the affirmative defense of knowledge. The case law pertaining to con-
structive possession lends itself to the possibility of presumed knowledge in certain
cases. Thus, the "affirmative defense" of lack of knowledge is routinely unavaila-
ble. The Court also failed to recognize the severity of punishment under Florida's
Criminal Code. Under the 1914 Narcotics Act, a defendant could face fines of up to
$2,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years. 142 Under the Florida Statutes, a
defendant could face a term of imprisonment of up to fifteen years, and/or a fine of
up to $10,000.143 Clearly, the punishments under Florida's Statutes are more severe
than the "public welfare" punishments described in the 1914 Narcotics Act, and
thus should receive greater constitutional scrutiny under Staples. While the Court
relied upon case law that upheld legislative discretion to proscribe crimes and case
law that upholds public welfare offenses, it failed to apply the correct legal stand-
ard.
D. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal
The Florida Supreme Court spoke on the issue in Adkins and offered clarifica-
tion for Florida's judiciary. However, the government appealed Shelton to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal. 144 The Eleventh Circuit continued to ignore the
tripartite analysis set out in Staples. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the
standard of review for federal courts. 14 5 The Eleventh Circuit applied the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) deference. 146 Under this legal
scheme,
a federal court may not grant a petitioner habeas corpus relief on a
claim that was adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless
the state court decision was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
elements of the offense. . . . Such shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems
so important must be either proved or presumed is impermissible under the Due Process Clause.")); Morisette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (emphasizing the law endows the accused with an "overriding presump-
tion of innocence . . . which extends to every element of the crime."); U.S. v. Blakenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1127
(1Ith Cir. 2004) ("[A] defendant is never obligated to prove anything to a jury, and a jury is entitled to believe a
defendant's claims regardless of whether he offers proof to substantiate them.").
140. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1298 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 620).
141. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 611-19.
142. Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, § 9, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
143. See FLA. STAT. §775.082; FLA. STAT. § 775.083; FLA. STAT. § 893.13.
144. Shelton, 691 F.3d at 1350.
145. Id. at 1353.
146. Id. at 1352.
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mined by the Supreme Court," or (2) "was based on an unreasona-
ble determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding."1 4 7
Consequently, the court never reached the issue of whether the Statute com-
plied with due process, but rather focused on the issue of whether habeas corpus
could be granted to the petitioner.148 The court found that, although it was a per
curiam opinion, Shelton's Fifth District Court of Appeal's case was "an 'adjudica-
tions on the merits' entitled to AEDPA deference."'149 Thus, habeas corpus relief
could not be granted unless the decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable appli-
cation of, clearly established federal law.150 The court found that Florida's Fifth
District did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law.' The court
noted that "'an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incor-
rect application of federal law."" 52 Therefore, the court never answered the ques-
tion of whether the state court's interpretation of federal law was incorrect-but
applied a higher threshold-whether or not it was unreasonable.
V. REMEDIES FOR THE SHELTON PROBLEM
A. Supreme Court Review
Certainly, this is an important question for resolution by the United States Su-
preme Court. The petitioner in Shelton has recently filed for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.153 The Supreme Court should find Shelton's reasoning quite per-
suasive. Prior to the Legislature's enactment of section 813.101, the Florida Su-
preme Court has opined on the issue, reached the same result as Shelton, and used
the same constitutional analysis.' 54 Is there any real reason to give deference to
section 813.101's legislative findings in light of a constitutional due process viola-
tion? Especially in a time of shrinking state budgets and resources, the State should
not be shifting the burden of proof onto defendants to prove their innocence. 55
The Florida Supreme Court should return to the Chicone era interpretation of
section 893.13 and declare section 893.101 unconstitutional. Alternatively, it could
graft a more effective affirmative defense into the Statute. The court could accom-
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1352-53.
149. Id. at 1353.
150. Shelton, 691 F.3d at 1353.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1352.
153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shelton v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 12-7430, 2012 WL 6969292
(U.S.S.C. Nov. 20, 2012).
154. See generally Chicone v. State, 684 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1996).
155. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (emphasizing the law endows the accused with
an "overriding presumption of innocence ... which extends to every element of the crime."); United States v.
Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1127 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that "[a] defendant is never obligated to prove
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plish this by reconsidering Florida's opinions that provided a presumption of
knowledge in exclusive possession or "plain view" cases. By providing a defendant
with a more effective affirmative defense, this could bring section 893.13 within
the limits of due process. However, the easiest and most efficient solution to the
problem is to return to the Florida Supreme Court's holdings in Chicone and Scott
and to re-graft a scienter requirement into the Statute.
The lower courts have applied the wrong legal framework to this question.
Yes, public welfare offenses have been upheld as strict liability crimes. However,
since the penalties for the crimes are so severe, the social stigma attached to a drug
conviction is so crushing, and because the Statute has a tendency to regulate innoc-
uous conduct, the Statute should be found facially unconstitutional. The lower
courts have also failed to review the case law by eliminating the so-called "affirma-
tive defense" of lack of knowledge.15 6 It is clear that in cases of exclusive posses-
sion, or "plain view," this defense is wholly inapplicable.157 Because the scheme of
constructive possession cases in Florida eliminate the affirmative defense of lack of
knowledge, section 893.101 not only shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on
this issue, but fully eliminates any sort of mens rea element.'58 This is not a case of
"partial" elimination of a mens rea element. Rather, under Florida's current legal
framework, it is a full elimination-making it a strict liability crime. Thus, the
Florida Supreme Court should apply the Staples analysis discussed above. If the
court applies this Staples analysis, it would unquestionably find that this Statute-
and the current legal scheme eliminating an affirmative defense-is in violation of
due process.
B. Legislative Remedies
If the Legislature does not wish to repeal section 893.101, lowering penalties
may be a viable alternative. The penalties for drug possession or sale in Florida are
high. As of now, possession of any controlled substance listed in section 893.03
could result in a first, second, or third-degree felony depending on the schedul-
ing.'59 First-degree felonies can be punishable by up to a life sentence of incarcera-
tion.160 For trafficking, conspiracy, and repeat offenders, Florida has minimum-
mandatory sentencing guidelines.161 Marijuana possession of less than twenty
grams is considered a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in pris-
on or a $1,000 fine.162
The best solution to the "strict liability" issue in Shelton may lie with the Flori-
da Legislature: a shift to the drug court model for sentencing of drug possession
and trafficking crimes. Most Florida courts today are moving toward the drug court
156. See supra, notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
157. See supra, note 70 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
159. FLA. STAT. § 893.03; FLA. STAT. § 893.13; FLA. STAT. § 893.06.
160. FLA. STAT. § 775.082.
161. FLA. STAT. § 893.135.
162. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(6)(b); FLA. STAT. § 775.083.
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model for misdemeanor drug offenses. Drug courts are a viable and effective
method to achieve the State's goals of deterring drug addiction and saving money
on high incarceration rates. These programs include mandatory drug testing, coun-
seling, judicial monitoring, as well as a wide range of alternative sentences.16 3 By
statutorily changing the sentencing guidelines for first time drug offenders, the
state could steer more defendants into these effective programs and save the state
large sums of taxpayer dollars. In 2009, the cost of housing an inmate was $19,469
per year.'6 By placing more defendants in drug court or pre-trial diversion pro-
grams, the costs shift from the state to the defendant, as defendants are held re-
sponsible for keeping up with the cost of their program. Research has indicated that
both the programs' treatment and supervision components are significant factors in
reducing prison admissions. 16 5 This is because of the more demanding require-
ments of drug courts and the larger incentives for defendants to refrain from crimi-
nal activity.16 6
Currently, however, Florida has not expanded its drug court eligibility program
to prison bound defendants.' 67 The Legislature could redress the problem in Shelton
with expanding the drug court program to non-violent drug offenders with felony
convictions. 68
Stakeholders indicated that there is strong incentive for such offenders to par-
ticipate in the post-adjudicatory drug court programs as a means of avoiding incar-
ceration. . . . Legislature could change the statute to allow drug courts to serve of-
fenders with a non-violent criminal history and a sentencing score in the low range
for mandatory prison, for example between 44 and 60 points. Our analysis of 2007
prison admissions identified 1,972 non-violent offenders with identified drug
treatment needs who received sentencing scores between 44 and 60. Florida law
previously allowed but currently prohibits judges from using an offender's sub-
stance abuse addiction to justify a non-prison alternative for offenders who score
over 44 points. The Legislature could remove this exclusion from statute to permit
judges, in their discretion, to place appropriate offenders into drug court. 69
Extending the drug court model to felony convictions for drug offenses would
dramatically reduce the harsh penalties Florida currently provides for within its
statutory scheme. A simple and modern statutory change to Florida's drug law
could bring section 893.13 back into conformity with the constitutional safeguards
of due process. This simple solution can achieve two functional goals: (1) fully
redress the constitutional challenges brought by Shelton, by reducing the harsh
163. For more information see Supreme Court Task Force on Treatment-Based
Drug Courts, FLORIDA'S ADULT DRUG COURT (April, 2007) available at
http://www.flcourts.org/genpublic/family/drugcourt/bin/toolkit.pdf.
164. Florida Department of Corrections 2009-2010 Budget, available at
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/0910/budget.html (last visited Feb. 5,2013).
165. State Drug Courts Could Expand to Target Prison Bound Adults, Office of Program Policy Analysis
and Govemment Accountability, Rep. No. 09-13 (March, 2009), available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/0913rpt.pdf.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 5.
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penalties and stigma attached to drug convictions; and (2) save the state significant
wealth, capital, labor, and resources in a time of economic uncertainty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly this Statute is a violation of due process as it creates a scheme of
extremely harsh penalties. Florida has minimum-mandatory sentencing for certain
drug trafficking offenses, which can give defendants up to fifteen years in prison in
addition to a $10,000 fine. The social stigma attached to drug related offenses is
also extraordinarily harsh. Many defendants cannot find jobs after being released
and will have the stigma of a drug conviction attached to them for life. The Statute
also regulates innocuous conduct. There are situations in which the "affirmative
defense" of knowledge cannot be utilized. These situations are constructive posses-
sion settings, where knowledge can be presumed in cases of "plain view" and "ex-
clusive possession." A defendant, who is unknowingly transporting drugs in his or
her vehicle and is the only person inside the vehicle, may not raise the affirmative
defense of lack of knowledge. The affirmative defenses "available" to defendants
in these situations are no more than "smoke and mirrors." It is not a partial elimina-
tion of mens rea, which is in the description of the legislature to proscribe, but ra-
ther a full elimination of a vital criminal element. Thus, under the Staples tripartite
analysis section 893.13 is facially unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the Florida Su-
preme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have either avoided the issue or incorrectly
applied the applicable federal law to the issue. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will
find that this type of criminal scheme is not only unconstitutional, but is a rather
severe and ineffective way of curbing abuse.
462 Vol. 18, No. 2
22
Barry Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 8
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol18/iss2/8
